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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Putin stumps 
President Putin launched his official campaign to retain the presidency with a 
classic "state of the nation" style address to his election agents at Moscow’s 
Lomonosov State University and broadcast live on national television. (1) 
 
Putin began by recounting the woes that had befallen Russia by the time he 
came to prominence in 1999: "The destructive degeneration of statehood that 
accompanied the disintegration of the Soviet Union spread to the Russian 
Federation;" the demise of the USSR, in fact, was "a national tragedy on an 
enormous scale;" (2) "A third of the population was pushed below the poverty 
line;" the country became dependent on international fiscal organizations and all 
manner of international financial speculators, which was humiliating." (3) The 
debased state of the Russian Federation culminated in the audacity of 
international terrorists to attack Russian territory. 
 
The internal state bureaucratic structures were equally degraded by the 
corruption, which ran rampant during the transition to a market economy. Putin 
did a remarkable job of shredding the achievements of the previous 
administration by laying the blame on large, systemic changes rather than 
individuals. 
 
Listing his own accomplishments, Putin credited his regime with restoring 
"constitutional law and order;" strengthening "the vertical of federal executive 
power;" turning the parliament into a professional "working lawmaking body;" 
putting en end to "the degradation of state authority, of the army’s weakening and 
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the destruction of law enforcement bodies…." Changes to the judicial system and 
dramatic economic improvements round out Putin’s vaunted accomplishments. 
(4) 
 
The goals of his next term, the duration of which was brought into doubt in the 
question and answer session that followed, include the curtailing of 
"administrative arbitrariness" in state and official structures, as well as in law 
enforcement agencies; the elimination of "the terrorist network;" and 
improvements to the social sphere, specifically in healthcare and education. (5) 
 
As reported in the last N.I.S. Observed, Putin has a fairly straightforward 
campaign message, and he is sticking to it. Although he has, for now, eschewed 
debates, he is, otherwise at least, appearing to run a familiar form of electoral 
campaign. Perhaps observers and analysts can take comfort in the style of this 
presidential election, and not let their thoughts wander to the lack of effective 
competition in the field, the missing candidate, Moscow explosions, or the ever-
expanding role of the security services in Putin’s administration. 
 
A longer term? An heir? 
In the question and answer session after his televised address at Moscow State 
University, President Putin once again cautioned against altering the Constitution 
to increase the length of presidential service, but simultaneously called his 
constitutional commitment into doubt when he suggested that an increase to a 
seven year term would be too much, but five years (instead of the constitutional 
four year term), sounded about right. Some analysts also expressed surprise that 
he went so far as to suggest that he would recommend his own successor at the 
end of his term. (6) Considering that Putin won the Presidency largely because 
former President Yel’tsin publicly chose Putin as his successor and named him to 
the post upon his resignation, Putin’s faith in this particular mechanism of 
succession should not be such a startling admission. Contrary to pundit 
prognostication however, it seems unlikely that Putin would saddle himself with a 
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clear successor early on in his next presidential term (assuming he wins: wink, 
wink). Fundamental changes in personnel throughout the government and 
possibly, though less likely, the Kremlin administration may occur in the 
aftermath of the election, but that is a typical response in many governments. 
Whether Kasianov stays or Sergei Ivanov moves may be the result of short-term 
considerations, not a four (or five) year plan to appoint a suitable successor. 
Putin may not be brilliant, but he certainly seems smart enough not to play the 
lame duck for four (or five) long years. 
 
The Two Borodins 
Pavel Borodin, an official of the presidential administration, was named to the 
Central Electoral Commission by Vladimir Putin last week. This is apparently not 
the same Pavel Borodin of Russian-Belarus Union, Swiss laundering trials and 
golden dacha bathroom fixture fame, but another Pavel Borodin. (7) Who knows? 
Perhaps there’s a relative and heir to the Kremlin butler’s secrets? 
 
Source Notes: 
 
1. President Vladimir Putin’s Address to his Authorised Representatives," 
RIA-Novosti, 12 Feb 04 via JRL (JRL) #8064, 12 Feb 04 (RIA-Novosti). 
2. Associated Press (AP), 12 Feb 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
3. RIA-Novosti, op. cit. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. ITAR-TASS, 12 Feb 04 via JRL#8064, 12 Feb 04. 
7. ITAR-TASS, 6 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
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Moscow Metro Blast. 
At 8:30 a.m. on February 6 an explosion occurred on a commuter train just 
outside the Autozavadskai station on Moscow’s Metro. 39 persons died instantly, 
while 150 individuals were wounded. In response to the attack, the surrounding 
Metro system was largely closed down, as security forces attempted to gather 
evidence for their investigation. According to initial reports by crime scene 
experts, the blast was equivalent to 5 kilograms of TNT. (1) 
 
President Putin, who had been meeting with Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliev at 
the Kremlin, immediately singled out Chechen terrorists, stating that "we know for 
certain that Maskhadov and his bandits are linked with this terror." (2) 
 
Several days after the explosion, on February 10, FSB investigators announced 
what they claimed to be a major breakthrough: In their stated opinion, the Metro 
attack was carried out by the same group that perpetrated last December’s 
Stavropol train bombing. Crime scene investigators reportedly discovered 
residue of the same explosive mixture–saltpeter, hexogen and TNT, as well as a 
triggering switch similar to those used in Stavropol. (3) The question of whether 
Maskhadov, a rival Chechen faction, or another group altogether carried out the 
attack pales into insignificance in comparison with the revelation that Moscow 
and the FSB may have had specific warning of this attack. 
 
According to a report carried both in the St. Petersburg and Moscow Times, 
Nazir Aidabolov, a Russian citizen from the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, 
walked into the Russian embassy in Tblisi on February 10, and demanded to 
speak to an FSB officer. According to Georgian Security Minister Valeri 
Khabudzania, he warned that Chechen terrorists planned to carry out a "huge" 
attack in Moscow the next day. (4) While it is unclear what, if any, details 
Aidabolov passed along, it seems unusual that the FSB did not institute 
emergency security measures. It is clear however, that the FSB has been 
lobbying for greater resources and responsibilities. 
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Three days after the attack, on 9 February, Vyacheslav Ushakov, Nikolai 
Patrushev’s deputy at the FSB, addressed the Duma. He stated that the FSB 
should be permitted to "do preventative work" in order to "stop terrorist acts early 
on and detain both their possible perpetrators and executors." (5) Ushakov stated 
that the FSB wanted a new anti-terrorist bill, similar in its scope to that of the U.S. 
Patriot Act, passed in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Security 
Services, said Ushakov, needed the same "unprecedentedly harsh rights in the 
fight against terrorism." (6) Is such legislation truly necessary, and why does the 
FSB want it? 
 
As recent events, such as those surrounding the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, 
Mikhail Trepashkin and others have shown, the FSB is already able to act with 
impunity. Moreover, the security service by now has unprecedented levels of 
power and resources far above those allotted to counterintelligence agencies 
elsewhere. Is it possible there is concern at the highest levels of the FSB that 
they could, one day, be called to account for their actions, and that therefore they 
will need an excess of authority, officially enshrined in law? For now, the FSB 
draws its support and authority directly from the President himself and may rise 
and fall with his personal stature. The offices of the security services may feel 
more secure themselves if the police state is enshrined in law. 
 
Was Ivan Rybkin kidnapped? 
Ivan Rybkin disappeared on February 5.  He was last seen that Thursday, when 
his bodyguards dropped him off at his apartment. An official search for the 
missing Presidential candidate was started after his wife, Albina, stated that she 
believed her husband might have been kidnapped or even killed in order to 
remove him from the Presidential race. (7) Six days later, on Tuesday 11 
February, Rybkin reappeared in Kiev, Ukraine. Speaking to Radio Ekho Moskvy, 
Rybkin stated that he had been stunned when he had read about his 
disappearance in a newspaper. He added that he had simply decided to take a 
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few days off to recover from the stress of the Presidential race, insisting that "I 
have the right to a few days privacy." (8) 
 
Over the next few days, however, Rybkin’s story changed dramatically. At first, 
Rybkin claimed that he had not, as previously claimed, traveled to Kiev on 
vacation. Rather, he left Russia in order to escape FSB surveillance teams, by 
whom he claims to be "always closely watched," and in order to meet with 
"political consultants" advising him on his election campaign. (9) Rybkin added 
that it is a fallacy to claim that the FSB did not know of his whereabouts: "The 
secret services knew where I was all the time. My papers were checked by 
border guards. Push a button and computers will display all the relevant 
information." (10) 
 
Several days later, Rybkin reappeared in London, where his story changed yet 
again. Rybkin claimed that he had been lured to Kiev under false pretences by 
the FSB, under the auspices of holding "peace talks" with Chechen rebel leader 
Alan Maskhadov. (11) While in Kiev, he claims to have been drugged and 
kidnapped. Although he did not make any direct accusations, Rybkin stated that 
he now believed that "this election is a game without rules, and it can end for me 
without ever beginning." (12) He added that for the sake of his family’s safety, he 
intends to continue his campaign from abroad. At this point in time, his wife 
remains in Moscow. 
 
Over the weekend, more details in Rybkin’s story have emerged. According to 
interviews given to Russika Izvestia, and the St. Petersburg Times, Rybkin 
claims that on arrival in Kiev, he was met by security service officers, assigned to 
transport him to the apartment where the ‘meeting’ with Maskhadov was to take 
place. Upon arrival, the officers served tea. Several minutes later, Rybkin felt 
drowsy, and then passed out. Rybkin stated that he awoke in a different 
apartment four days later, feeling "smashed and very tired." (13) At this point, 
Rybkin claims that the FSB officers informed him that he had been subject to a 
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"special operation," and showed him a "disgusting" video-tape (Rybkin refused to 
elaborate on the contents), designed to compromise his election chances. (14) 
Finally, Rybkin claims that the FSB forced him to call his family to tell them he 
was safe, and that they then placed him on a flight to Moscow. (14) Rybkin has 
stated that he did not give the full story in Moscow, because he feared for his life. 
(15) 
 
The possibility that Rybkin was indeed drugged has been aired from two 
quarters: first, Oleg Kalugin, a former senior KGB officer published an article in 
Novaya Gazeta on 11 February, in which he claimed that Rybkin had been given 
a substance called SP-117. This drug, claimed Kalugin, was used on a regular 
basis by the KGB’s First and Second Directorates during the last ten years of the 
Cold War. (16) The substance apparently induces a state similar to that of severe 
alcoholic intoxication. Secondly, an independent Russian psychiatrist, Emmanuil 
Gushansky of the Versia Independent Psychiatric Clinic stated in an interview 
with Radio Ekho Moskvy that Rybkin’s behaviour was consistent with the side-
effects caused by psychotropic drugs. (16) Is Rybkin telling the truth, or is his 
story, as Gennady Gudkov of the Duma Security Committee has suggested, 
merely a huge election publicity stunt? (17) 
 
First, it is important to note that Rybkin, has, as a result of his time in the Security 
Council during the Yel'tsin Presidency, the contacts with which to make a 
meeting with Maskhadov possible. Secondly, there are clear inconsistencies in 
the story Rybkin gave in Moscow: why did he need to travel out of Russia to 
meet "political consultants"? Is it truly likely that a candidate in Russia’s 
Presidential election would leave Moscow without warning, and upon arrival in 
Kiev remain incommunicado, without access to television, newspapers, or 
telephone for five days, unless in the sincere belief that he was meeting 
Maskhadov at a secret, secure location? 
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On the other hand, the question must be asked as to why the FSB would need to 
remove Rybkin from the campaign: he poses no legitimate threat to Putin’s 
chances for re-election in March. It is unlikely that the truth of this matter will be 
known for some time. But based on the balance of evidence currently available, 
and the FSB’s past record, the possibility of an operation to discredit Rybkin 
cannot be discounted. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
1. ITAR-TASS, 0437 GMT, 7 Feb 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0207 via World News 
Connection. 
2. BBC Monitoring, 12 Feb 04; Chechen Web Press via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
3. WPS Russian Political Monitor, 11 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
4. The Moscow Times, "Tblisi: Russia was warned of attack," 10 Feb 04 via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
5. BBC Monitoring, 9 Feb 04; Channel One TV Moscow via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
6. Ibid. 
7. The Moscow Times, "Rybkin Reappears with no answers," 11 Feb 04 via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
8. BBC Monitoring, 10 Feb 04;  Ekho Moskvy Radio via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
9. Ibid. 
10. WPS, 12 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
11. The St. Petersburg Times, "Rybkin: I am a ‘Special Operation Victim,’" 17 
Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
12. www.bbc.co.uk/news, 13 Feb 04; "Candidate fears return to Russia." 
13. The St. Petersburg Times, "Rybkin: I am a ‘Special Operation Victim,’" 17 
Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
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14. Ibid. 
15. Novaya Gazeta, "Was Rybkin given a dose of SP-117?" 11 Feb 04; WPS 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
16. Agence-France-Presse, 15 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
17. WPS, 11 Feb 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Dullea 
 
Not yet time to panic over Russia’s CIS integration plans 
In recent weeks Moscow has taken several steps tied to its plan of "reintegrating" 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). (This may be viewed in the 
context of President Putin's expressed regret over the demise of the USSR.) One 
of those steps was a bilateral meeting between Russian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Igor Ivanov and his Belarussian counterpart in Minsk to reinvigorate 
cooperation between the two states and plans for the Russia-Belarus Union. 
While the success of efforts for such a union have ebbed and flowed over the 
past several years, this month’s talks showed a united front vis-à-vis enlargement 
of the European Union (E.U.) and the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). 
 
At the meeting, the foreign ministers signed an agreement on a program for a 
coordinated foreign policy in 2004 and 2005. The program, which was described 
by the Belarusian Foreign Minister Syarhey Martynaw as "embrac[ing] (…) all 
aspects of the two countries' foreign policy," (1) will focus on overcoming what 
the two countries perceive as the negative consequences of E.U. enlargement. 
Moreover, the foreign ministers stated that they will work jointly in their 
cooperation with other international organizations, such as the UN, NATO and 
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). At the meeting, Ivanov and 
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Martynaw jointly reminded NATO of its pledge not to deploy nuclear weapons or 
substantial combat forces on the territory of the newest NATO members. 
 
Additional plans for CIS integration were expressed by Nikolai Bordyuzha, 
Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) - the 
military arm of the CIS — when he told journalists on 5 February that the CSTO 
aims to establish close contacts with NATO in the near future. Bordyuzha 
supported this plan for unified contact with the Western military alliance based on 
the proximity of NATO’s operations in Afghanistan to the territory of the CIS, 
namely Tajikistan. He also expressed the CSTO’s joint concern about the 
possibility of NATO deploying threatening forces or weaponry in places close to 
the CIS, such as in the Baltic States. This plan, according to Bordyuzha, has 
already been discussed by CSTO defense and foreign ministers and now only 
awaits action at the presidential level. (2) 
 
Finally, a draft document from the CIS has been drawn up which proposes 
regulations for a uniform system to register citizens of other countries that enter 
the territory of the CIS. This system, which was reportedly Russia’s idea (3), 
includes a databank that would be shared by CIS countries in an effort to hamper 
terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal migration and organized crime. 
 
Taken as a whole, these steps and other recent bilateral and regional 
cooperative arrangements among CIS countries might give the appearance of an 
all-out rush towards tighter integration of the CIS with Russia at the helm. This 
would seem, moreover, to match Moscow’s stated foreign policy goals. However, 
fruitful cooperation between Minsk and Moscow is never a safe bet; there is also 
scarce precedent for significantly effective collaboration, beyond words, within 
the framework of the CIS or CSTO. So while the signs are visible that integration 
efforts are being made, it is still too early to measure accurately the actual 
progress of Russia’s CIS integration campaign. 
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MFA lobbies for acceptance into OIC 
The Indonesian press has reported that Russian Ambassador-at-Large for 
Islamic Affairs, Veniamin Popov, was in Jakarta recently to lobby the Indonesian 
government for support for Moscow’s bid to join the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC). (4) The President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, 
attended and addressed an October 2003 OIC summit in Malaysia, where he 
asserted that Russia is qualified to be a member of the Muslim organization 
given the size of its Muslim population. Putin has also stated that Russia is 
"prepared to take on obligations of a financial nature that are necessary to join 
the [OIC]." (5) Popov appears quietly to be continuing that campaign. 
 
Popov is head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) so-called Islamic 
Factor, an office established in August 2003 to address the Islamic issues within 
the ministry. While in Jakarta, he met with Indonesian Vice President Hamzah, 
other government officials and leaders from two large Muslim organizations, 
Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah. Popov explained that Russia desires 
first to gain observer status in the OIC and then, eventually, full membership. 
 
While in Jakarta this month, Popov rejected suggestions that Moscow’s OIC 
membership plans represented an attempt to "exploit the growing anti-American 
sentiment among Muslims." (6) Nevertheless, OIC membership would strengthen 
Russia’s ties and influence in the Muslim world, particularly in the Muslim states 
that partially comprise Russia’s near-abroad — where Washington’s presence 
and activities have been a source of irritation to Moscow of late. Indonesian 
press reports gave no indication as to the results of Mr. Popov’s efforts. 
 
Is Moscow wavering on troop withdrawal from Georgia? 
Recent statements by Russian senior military officials might be an indication that 
Moscow is willing to compromise on how long its military forces will remain in 
Georgia. Another possibly conciliatory sign was the agreement by Russia to 
allow an inspection of its base at Gudauta in Abkhazia. The inspection, which 
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would most likely be led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), would aim at confirming that the base is "inactive," as Russia 
declared it to be in 2002. Disbanding the base was part of Russia’s obligations 
under the Istanbul summit agreement of 1999. 
 
On 2 February 2004, Moscow welcomed the passage of United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) Resolution 1594, which extended the peacekeeping mission in 
Georgia until 31 July 2004. Not only does this resolution give the Russian 
"peacekeepers" renewed UN backing, it also gives added legitimacy to the 
military role of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which has the 
mandate for that peacekeeping mission—although the forces there are wholly 
Russian. 
 
With this fresh international support for its peacekeeping presence in Georgia 
now a reality, Russian military officials began to suggest flexibility in their plans 
for the other Russian forces there. On 2 February, the first deputy head of the 
Russian General Staff, Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevsky, told the Interfax news 
agency that, although withdrawing troops within three years as insisted on by 
Tblisi is "ridiculous," it may be possible to speed the withdrawal of Russian forces 
out of Georgia to within seven to nine years. (7) Two days later, a senior Russian 
military official stated, on the condition of anonymity, that such a pull-out might be 
possible within four to five years. (8) 
 
While not denying the possibility of a speedier withdrawal, Russian Minister of 
Defense Sergei Ivanov, told a news conference in Munich that military bases and 
soldiers will be removed from Georgia only after the housing and other 
infrastructure was in place in Russia to receive them. Although statements from 
senior Russian military officials do not necessarily equate to official foreign 
policy, the comments might have been a means of setting a non-hostile tone for 
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili’s visit to Moscow. Indeed the Putin-
Saakshvili talks were full of gestures of friendship and cooperation. Saakshvili, 
 13 
however, was not fooled by generals’ proposed timeline changes, stating in a 
Moscow radio interview, "Russia's policy should come from the Kremlin. That is 
why I am visiting the Kremlin." (9) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
1. ITAR-TASS, 2 Feb 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0202 via World News Connection. 
2. RIA, 5 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
3. ITAR-TASS, 3 Feb 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0203 via World News Connection. 
4. The Jakarta Post, 2 Feb 04; PT Bina Media Sejahtera Tenggara via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Daily News Bulletin, 
www.mid.ru, 15 Aug 03. 
6. DPA, 2 Feb 04 via Johnson's Russia List (JRL) #8045, 3 Feb 04. 
7. REUTERS, 2 Feb 04 via JRL #8044. 
8. AFP, 4 Feb 04 via JRL #8051, 6 Feb 04. 
9. Ekho Moskvy, 10 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
REGIONS 
Halt! Who goes where? 
Russian demographics have experienced a severe shakeup in the past decade, 
not only in terms of the number of Russians, but also in terms of where those 
Russians live. The final processing of the 2002 census data recently was 
completed, and the results show that Russia’s population totals 145.2 million 
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individuals, a decrease of 1.8 million persons since the 1989 census (1) 
[Between the 1979 and 1989 censuses the populations of the RSFSR increased 
by 10.7%; extrapolated to 1999, the population then should have amounted to 
162.7 million and, by 2002 to approximately 167.6 million — a hypothetical 
population loss of 22.4 million —Ed.] While the numbers are not shocking, since 
preliminary results were released months ago, the confirmation of the de-
population trends continues to shake demographic analysts. 
 
The trends indicated by the 2002 census include a decrease in sheer numbers, 
coupled with a move away from the more isolated regions, into the cities. Almost 
20 percent of the country’s population lives in 13 cities of 1 million or more; the 
two most-populated urban centers, Moscow and St. Petersburg, shoulder nearly 
half of the urban burden, with 10.4 million and 4.7 million residents, respectively. 
Still, even urban areas have experienced a loss in residents — down 1.6 million, 
compared with a 0.2 million decrease in rural areas. (2) 
 
That loss in (registered) population apparently hasn’t equated to a loss in (actual) 
population, at least in Moscow. The capital’s representative on the Russian 
Federation Government Migration Policy Commission, Sergei Smidovich, 
expressed his concern over what he depicts as government inaction while the 
city struggles to maintain its overburdened infrastructure. "[W]e do need to begin 
taking measures. Metaphorically speaking, Moscow is Russia's heart. And if 
there is an excessively large infusion of new blood (that is, migrants), it may 
suffer a heart attack," Smidovich said. One possible solution, he added, is the 
return of satellite cities, with the relocation of individuals and enterprises... 
whether they like it or not. And what about persons who don’t want to go to the 
satellite cities? "The State Duma needs to demonstrate political will -- registration 
needs to be made compulsory. We need to introduce criminal penalties for illegal 
residence and working (I mean those same immigrant workers) including jail 
sentences, huge fines, and so on," Smidovich explained. (3) 
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Yet, while some areas have proven inhospitable to immigrants (4), immigration 
has helped to compensate for three-quarters of the natural population loss 
recorded over the past 10 years. Russians retain the overwhelming majority with 
116 million persons, constituting 80 percent of the population. (5) The flow of 
immigration has been strongest from many former Soviet republics; however, 
there has been a steady stream away from Russia as well -- indeed, the 
country’s nominal Jewish population has decreased by more than 50 percent 
(from 540,000 in 1989 to 230,000 in 2002). (6) 
 
ELECTIONS 
Where in the world was Ivan Rybkin? And does anybody really care? 
The mysterious disappearance of presidential candidate Ivan Rybkin created few 
ripples in the political environment. Worse was the general absence of uproar 
concerning a missing politician as the presidential campaign got underway. It is 
difficult to determine whether that lack of concern was due to a growing cynicism 
about the political climate in Russia, or to the candidate’s noteworthy lack of 
support among the masses (current polling indicates he would be hard-pressed 
to get 1 percent of the vote). (7) Still, after making no contact with his family or 
campaign team for five days, Rybkin emerged, and reported that he had taken 
some personal time in Kiev and hadn’t known he was considered missing. Given 
that he had left no note for his wife, and missed picking up his candidate 
registration certificate, rumors and allegations surrounding his disappearance 
were plentiful, ranging from kidnapping, to intraparty wrangling, to security 
services action, to public relations ploy. (8) The explanation most difficult to 
swallow was Rybkin’s own. 
 
The second unlikeliest explanation is a public relations maneuver, unless Rybkin 
can take credit for being the least-savvy PR person on the planet. While he has 
returned home safe and sound, he has lost his campaign manager, Ksenya 
Ponomareva, who resigned. (9) And his wife has stated that he is not the type of 
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person who should be running the country. (10) [For updates on this story, 
please see the "Security Services" section of this NIS Observed.]  
 
DUMA 
Deputies annoyed that Latvia chooses to support Latvian language in 
schools 
In the Duma, rhetoric is flying in response to Latvia’s recent decision to cut back 
Russian-language instruction in schools, limiting it to courses intended to 
preserve national identity and leaving all other classes in Latvia to be held in ... 
Latvian. The return of the rhetoric, in which the Riga government is characterized 
as "fascist" (11) is noteworthy for filling a silence that has existed for the last 
couple of years. (That absence of anti-Latvian rhetoric had followed the failure of 
an earlier policy attempting to portray Latvia’s encouragement of its state 
language as contradicting international norms.) Apparently, the nearly-
omnipresent United Russia faction has found a way to rally the other parties: by 
waving the nationalist banner. There is, of course, no shortage of support for 
such an attitude among other deputies. MP Nikolai Kharitonov, representing the 
Communist Party, warned that the Riga-passed bill signified apartheid in Latvia. 
"This is a serious violation of generally-recognized norms of the international law 
and a challenge to Russia and the State Duma," Kharitonov declared. (12) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
1. ITAR-TASS, 11 Feb 04 via JRL #8062, 12 Feb 04. 
2. Rossiyskaya gazeta, 4 Nov 03 via The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 
vol. 55, no. 45, 10 Dec 03. 
3. Izvestiya , 31 Jan 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0203 via World News Connection. 
4. The NIS Observed, 8 Oct 03. 
5. Rossiyskaya gazeta, 4 Nov 03 via the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet 
Press, vol. 55, no. 45, 10 Dec 03. 
6. RIA Novosti, 11 Feb 04 via JRL #8062, 12 Feb 04. 
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7. Mayak Radio, 1700 GMT, 9 Feb 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0209 via World 
News Connection. 
8. ITAR-TASS in English, 1615 GMT, 9 Feb 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0209 via 
World News Connection, and Associated Press, 9 Feb 04 via JRL #8057, 
10 Feb 04. 
9. RIA Novosti, 10 Feb 04 via JRL #8057, 10 Feb 04. 
10. Moscow Times, 11 Feb 04 via JRL #8059, 11 Feb 04. 
11. St. Petersburg Times, 3 Feb 04 via JRL #8046, 3 Feb 04. 
12. ITAR-TASS in English 1304 GMT 6 Feb 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0206 via 
World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Kris Beasly and Paul Lyons 
 
Half a billion votes of confidence in the ubiquitous Soyuz 
In a major coup for the Russian space industry, on 5 February the Russian 
Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) signed an agreement with the European Space 
Agency (ESA) for the launch of Russian Soyuz rockets from the ESA space port 
at Kourou, French Guiana, starting in 2006. According to both ESA and 
Rosaviakosmos officials, there are two main elements to the arrangement: 
construction of a new launch pad for the Soyuz at Malmanoury (about six 
kilometers from the current Ariane-5 launch pad at Kourou) and development of 
an improved Soyuz rocket, dubbed the Soyuz-ST. The ESA will spend a little less 
than half a billion euros on these two projects. (1) 
 
Russia has been marketing Soyuz launchers for many years, but always based 
on launches from the main Russian Cosmodrome at Baikonaur (2), while facing 
competition from the U.S. (Atlas, Delta and Titan), the ESA (Ariane-4), and the 
Chinese (Long March) launchers. Russia has won a number of deals over the 
years, including some (at the moment, the only) "man-rated" (able to carry a 
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crew) launches to the International Space Station, but this deal constitutes an 
achievement for the Russian space industry because it’s the first time Russian 
launchers will lift off outside Russia or a part of the former USSR. Launching from 
Kourou instead of Baikonaur will increase the payload capacity to 4 tons from 1.5 
tons since launching almost directly along the equator requires significantly less 
fuel (taking advantage of the earth’s rotation), leaving more weight for payload, 
without any costly changes to the rocket motors. (3) 
 
The key change in the launcher market occurred a few years back, when the 
ESA decided to rely on the Ariane-5 and phase-out the Ariane-4. The Ariane-5 
has had major development problems, including losing the first launcher on lift-
off. Additionally, although it can be used as a medium lift launcher, the Ariane-5 
is mostly intended to be a upper-medium or heavy lift launcher. Consequently, 
ESA officials, seeking to fill the medium lift void in their line, decided it was more 
cost effective to upgrade and purchase the reliable Soyuz than to try to restart 
their own Ariane-4 line or to create a new launcher from scratch. (4) 
 
While the first tentative discussions of this deal began a few years ago, it gained 
momentum late in 2002 and early 2003 when the ESA launched the last of its 
Ariane-4 lifters and Russia became willing to launch its boosters from a 
"European" country (French Guiana is an overseas department of France). Both 
sides worked on the details behind closed doors, but the first glimmerings came 
to light when the ESA Ministerial Council in May 2003 tentatively approved a plan 
to pay for building the new pad required for the Soyuz. (5) The plan gained even 
more traction in Paris on 7 November 03 during a state visit by Russian 
President Vladimir Putin; Russian Vice Premier Boris Alyoshin and French Prime 
Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin signed an agreement ,which both protected 
Russian rocket technology and allowed Russia to transport its rockets through 
France and French territory (i.e. French Guiana) for launching at the ESA-owned 
spaceport. This agreement was important not only because without French 
permission, the rockets couldn’t launch from Kourou, but also because 
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Rosaviakosmos can now use existing French ocean-going barges to transport 
the Soyuz to South America rather than devote resources to create a fleet of their 
own. (6) 
 
The final, and hardest, details, those involving money, were ironed out and 
culminated in the 5 February 04 ESA-Rosaviakosmos agreement. The key 
features of the entire deal are that the ESA will pay 314 million euros to construct 
the new launch pad (with France paying half) and, in addition, will provide 
funding to Rosaviakosmos in order to upgrade the Soyuz to a new "ST" 
configuration. The upgrade will include a first-for-the-Soyuz digital control system 
and improvements to the first stage. (7) The Soyuz rocket, based upon Russia’s 
R-7 ICBM, has racked up the best record of any space launch vehicle in the 
world, since it first launched the Sputnik in 1957. The ESA will now be able to sell 
a vehicle that has more than 1700 successful launches to its credit, which include 
putting the first man in space (1961) and sending the latest supply capsule to the 
International Space Station (Jan 04). (8) 
 
The bottom line to this agreement is that Europe will pay approximately half a 
billion euros to gain access to a highly reliable medium lift launcher for many 
years, while Russia gains another market for its best space product, in a 
desirable location near the equator, and should get contracts for 4-5 launches a 
year for the next 10 years, giving it 40-45 percent of the medium lift market, all 
without spending a dime. (9) As a spokesman for the Russian Space Agency 
said, " It is good for the Europeans and Russians. For Russia it means new 
orders and the chance to get into orbit from the equator, and for the Europeans it 
means a carrier." (10) 
 
A global shield is a global shield is a global shield… 
As expected, Russia launched a major strategic command and control exercise 
last week, involving a large number of uniformed troops of every service and 
type. The last NIS Observed (4 Feb 04), discussed the upcoming exercise, 
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comparing it to the annual exercise held by the U.S. dubbed "Global Shield." 
Oddly enough, the Russians called their own exercise "Global Shield" as well! 
(11) 
 
Interestingly, the Russian military seemed concerned about the amount of press 
the exercise was getting in Moscow and sent the Deputy Chief of the General 
Staff to address the issue. On 10 February, Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevsky 
had a special press conference to set the record straight, saying that the exercise 
was "a routine, annual, planned exercise, by no means the largest of its kind, and 
it will last until the military control bodies and troops accomplish their training 
missions."(12) According to Baluyevsky, the scenario poses an "imaginary" 
enemy attacking Russia from all four directions (as well as space), triggering the 
events needed to train the troops. The objectives and premise of the exercise, 
according to General Baluyevsky, came from chapter three of the so-called 
"Ivanov Doctrine" (more properly, "Pressing Tasks of the Development of the 
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation") that was published in Moscow in 
October of 2003. He cites the section "The Character of Possible Armed 
Conflicts" and comments dryly "if one reads between the lines, it says that the 
principal enemy is America and the whole of NATO," adding, however, that the 
exercise's adversary is assumed. "There is not even a hint that it is the USA.. 
some other state in Europe or Asia…." (13) 
 
However much the General Staff downplays the exercise, it will be pretty much 
as previously described, with the exception of not launching AS-15 cruise 
missiles from bombers, with Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin directing the 
troops and Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov in overall command. RIA Novosti 
analyst Viktor Litovkin even mentioned that President Putin is likely to show up 
for the ICBM or SLBM test launches that will occur. In other words, it is still a 
major event, involving a large number of troops and weapons. It is interesting to 
note that Russia somehow seems to have "accounted" for slightly less than 
9,000 troops in the effort, since General Baluyevsky denied that Russia had 
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crossed the limit of notification set by the Vienna Treaty on Confidence-building 
Measures.(14) He also put to rest many of the wilder rumors circulating in the 
press, such as that 30% of all reservists would be called up, or that 75% of all 
airborne and 40% of all ground forces were involved. But he did add that one of 
the objectives was to check on the ability of some of the new "permanent 
readiness" units to be deployed long distances and immediately conduct 
operations. (15) 
 
No matter how it is spun, there can be no doubt that this exercise is a major 
strategic conventional and nuclear exercise, the likes of which Russia has 
seldom conducted in recent years. Of course, as long as Russia has strategic 
nuclear weapons, it must continue to exercise command and control of them, if 
only to ensure the security and safety mechanisms still work. 
 
Source Notes: 
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The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Dept. of Defense or the 
United States government. 
 
NAVY 
The hammer and pen: Desperate diplomacy or economic road show? 
Cold War politico-military diplomacy may be a vestige of a bygone era, although 
there are growing assertions that Russian "imperialism" is gaining traction and 
endangering relations with NATO and the United States due to a renaissance of 
Cold War-esque diplomacy being played out across the European and Asian 
landscapes. Central to this effort is Russia's interest in countering the United 
States' influence in Eastern Europe and Asia. As succinctly put by Russian 
sources, "when evaluating the U.S. military presence in Central Asia in the past 
two and a bit years, many experts believe that the situation has changed so 
much that Russia will no longer be able to ensure the region's security without 
the United States." (1) 
 
Despite assurances by Secretary of State Colin Powell that the United States 
"has no intention of surrounding Russia...we do not intend to move military 
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bases, the kind of bases that we had during the Cold War, closer to Russia just 
for the sake of moving them closer to Russia," (2) Russia clearly harbors 
increasing concern about the expanding U.S. influence eastward. After nearly a 
decade of forging inequitable relations with its former satellites and the newly-
independent states proximate to its borders, Russia has employed drastic 
diplomatic efforts to hold the American initiatives at bay. Years of Soviet 
aggression left Russia's neighbors anxious to exercise sovereign will. Their 
independent actions are treated frequently by Russia as threats. Colin Powell 
expounded further on the sovereignty question by stating to Izvestiya that "we 
recognize Russia's territorial integrity and its natural interest in lands that abut 
it...but, we recognize no less the sovereign integrity of Russia's neighbors and 
their rights to peaceful and respectful relations across their borders as well." (3) 
 
Despite the areas of competition and the occasional discord, nonetheless there 
are cooperative diplomatic efforts underway. Russian Defense Minister Ivanov 
has recently attempted to push for greater cooperation with NATO by giving 
"particular attention to the issue of renewing the dialogue between Russia and 
NATO on an agreement on the status of forces. We consider that opting for such 
an agreement will give an extra boost to the development of cooperation in the 
sphere of joint training exercises, command headquarters and troop exercises 
based at training centers located in various countries." (4) Ivanov is boldly 
maneuvering for more transparency from NATO by requesting NATO grant 
"permanent access to any new alliance base in Poland or the Baltic states [and 
that Russia should have] facilities of permanent monitoring at NATO bases to 
verify the fact that the ways of use of those facilities, as we are told, pose no 
threat to Russia."(5) It is highly unlikely that such a desperate request will be 
honored, or for that matter, entertained. 
 
In addition to engaging NATO, Russia is expanding military relations with France 
(and Germany). This became obvious in the wake of Russia's refusal to ally itself 
with the US-led coalition to liberate Iraq. In fact, this seems like a natural 
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response to U.S. pressure for Russia to define its relationship with the U.S. in the 
international community. Symbolic of the budding relationship with France, Chief 
of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff Anatoli Kvashnin received the French 
Order of the Legion of Honor during his recent visit to Paris. According to Chief of 
the French Armed Forces Staff General Henri Bentegeat, an additional outcome 
of the visit was that "2004 would witness many important events in bilateral 
military cooperation. The Russia-France Security Council will convene in Paris on 
March 5, the Jeanne D'Arc training ship will visit Russia in early May, and a 
Russian submarine will visit a French port in summer during a Russian-French 
naval drill." (6) 
 
Russia and Azerbaijan have solidified their contract of military cooperation as 
well, by signing the Moscow Declaration between President Putin and President 
Aliyev. The core of the agreement holds that the "Russian Federation and the 
Azerbaijan Republic will consolidate bilateral military and military-technical 
cooperation, meeting the interests of security of the two countries, but not 
spearheaded against third countries and not running counter to international 
obligations of Russia and Azerbaijan [and that] none of the sides will participate 
in any actions or measures of military, economic or financial nature, including 
through third countries." (7) Armenia, which has perhaps the most harmonious 
relations with Russia, has called for increased military cooperation with Russia to 
serve the needs of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). 
Clamoring for the sale of military equipment at domestic prices during a recent 
visit to Moscow, Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisyan believes that 
Russian-Armenian relations could be bolstered further by this "sweetheart deal," 
claiming that "the sale of military equipment within the framework of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) at Russia's internal prices would 
strengthen cooperation." (8) 
 
Russia's heightened attention to politico-military and techno-military relations has 
also reached historically and ideologically-significant areas such as Vietnam and 
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Spain. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Mikhail Dmitriyev recently concluded a 
visit to Vietnam under the aegis of the Russian Committee for International 
Military-Technical Cooperation. Dmitriyev extols Vietnam as "a strategic partner 
for Russia, with whom it is convenient to deal...we have possibilities of interaction 
in the sphere of military-technical cooperation, and we put these possibilities in 
practice, in effective annual plans of interaction." (9) In Spain, Russian Defense 
Minister Ivanov and Spanish Defense Minister Trillo "mapped out a concrete 
program for stepping up Russian-Spanish cooperation in the military-technical 
spheres." (10) 
 
Woven into the mosaic of the recent diplomatic ventures come designs by the 
Putin administration to renew the elite military stratum of general staff officers, to 
launch a large-scale exercise of the nuclear triad and calls for construction of 
aircraft carriers and multi-role ships as the core for a future blue water Navy. 
Lacking a clear signal from Moscow as to its relationship with the West, 
specifically the United States, and the historical similarities to the Cold War build 
up, make past (and present?) Russian imperialism seem ripe for debate. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
UKRAINE 
The West reacted harshly to recent developments concerning political "reform" in 
the Ukrainian parliament. In particular, the Council of Europe rights and 
democracy body condemned the plan to strip the Ukrainian people of their right 
to elect the President and threatened to suspend Ukraine's membership in the 
45-country group based in Strasbourg, France. The Ukrainian parliament then 
voted to amend a constitutional reform bill, removing the clause that would have 
abolished presidential elections by popular vote after 2006. (1) 
 
The opposition wanted to retain its chance for validation by popular election. It 
has this opportunity now, albeit a slim chance. The votes on 24 December and 
the more recent one, on 3 February were almost identical. The only difference is 
the removal of the constitutional amendment on the mode of electing the 
president. In the end, it will matter little how the president is elected or even who 
is elected, since, if the rest of the reform goes through, the president will have 
considerably less power, and his or her role will be reduced to a largely 
ceremonial one. 
 
The main powers of the president would be to veto laws, subject to an override 
by two-thirds of the parliament, and to nominate military, security and law-
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enforcement chiefs, also subject to parliamentary approval. The president would 
also have the right to dissolve the parliament. The prime minister and his cabinet, 
appointed by the parliament, would hold most of the executive power. (2) 
 
The idea of this fundamental change to the law in order to give more power to the 
parliament first came up after the elections of 1999 and was initiated, ironically 
enough, by the opposition factions. The whole concept of the reform is to give 
more power to the parliament - theoretically, a step towards a more democratic 
society. The Parliamentary system is, after all, present in most modern European 
democracies. 
 
However, when tense changes are attempted in such a contradictory manner, 
nine months before the elections, talk of democracy is not that convincing. At a 
time when the parliamentary majority is pro-Kuchma and his term is coming to an 
end, such fundamental changes constitute nothing less than another attempt by 
the current pro-presidential majority (and possibly Kuchma himself) to hold on to 
power for as long as possible. Kuchma has repeated numerous times that he 
was not planning on running for president in 2004, but he never mentioned 
anything about the parliament electing him as prime-minister. Thus, even if the 
most popular pro-Western Ukrainian politician, i.e. Yushchenko, is elected 
president, his term will be limited to an ineffective period in office. 
 
Yulia Timoshenko, who promised to fight the amendment bill in court, recently 
commented on the situation on a talk show on Radio Kontinent: "If these changes 
to the constitution become reality, then the 2004 society will be given the task of 
electing a president who will be empty-handed and without power… The 
president who will not be able to carry out promises made during the presidential 
election will be virtually discredited." (3) Thus, everything will remain in the hands 
of an oligarchic majority in parliament. 
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Ukrainian parliamentary speaker Volodymir Lytvyn claims that on the part of the 
opposition there is a lack of interest in carrying out political reform because 
reform initiators "decided first to win the elections, look around and then decide 
what powers they needed to implement their policy. But if we keep this system in 
place, whoever might come to power, whoever might become president, he will 
become another Kuchma tomorrow and, I admit, a more authoritarian one." (4) 
 
Constitutional reform is needed in Ukraine. It will take the power away from just 
one person, which constitutes a step closer to democracy. However, the 
constitution is a document with which the people of Ukraine, hopefully, will have 
to live for a long time; therefore, a hasty and controversial way of amending it is 
less than ideal. Ukraine needs time to debate possible amendments and be 
given time to think about them, rather than simply being told by whom when, and 
how to elect their leaders and representatives. 
 
BELARUS 
Small vendors go on strike 
In a country where 22 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, 
some individuals attempt to garner additional income by engaging in private 
business. Often, such "businesses" are mere street vendors' stalls, which sell 
various consumer goods. 
 
Belarussian authorities do not make it easy for such businesses to survive. 
Seventeen owners of stalls at Vitebsk's Mishel shopping center went on a hunger 
strike on Monday, 2 February, to protest against the state policy toward private 
vendors. The strikers want the city government to put an end to unfounded 
seizure of merchandise, and to shorten the list of goods subject to mandatory 
certification and registration with sanitary authorities. In addition, recently the 
authorities decided to transform several markets into trading centers, which 
would oblige small vendors to buy new licenses, use cash registers and present 
documents confirming the origins of their stock, thus eliminating the "grey 
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market" advantages over the state system and threatening the livelihood of 
thousands of vendors. (5) Vitebsk strikers were supported by other market 
vendors in Vitebsk, as well as in other parts of Ukraine. The authorities attempted 
to cover up the hunger strike. "The local network aired an interview with a city 
official…, who acknowledged that the markets were on strike, but denied the 
reports about the hunger strike," said Anatol Shumchanka, the leader of the 
Perspektiva small business association.(6) 
 
This incident only confirms the fact that the level of economic freedom in Belarus 
is one of the lowest in the world. In a 2003 economic freedom ranking of 155 
countries released by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, 
Belarus was ranked 154th now, 148th in 2001, and 151st in 2002. (7) The legal 
system in Belarus does not fully protect private property and, in 2000, Belarus 
passed a law enabling the government to nationalize the property of any 
individual or business deemed to be damaging the state. Natural resources, 
waters, forests and land are owned exclusively by the state. (8) Lukashenko also 
expanded the state's right to intervene in the management of private enterprise. 
In addition, businesses have been subject to arbitrary changes in regulations, 
numerous rigorous inspections, and arrests of "disruptive" businessmen and 
factory owners. (9) 
 
MOLDOVA 
Closure of media organizations. 
The Audio Visual Council (a media licensing agency) suspended licenses of the 
two pro-opposition media institutions, Antena C radio station and EuroTV 
Chisinau TV channel, on February 3, 2004, because the Chisinau city hall, the 
founder and the administrator of the two institutions, had not registered them as 
companies by the deadline set by the council in August 2003. The two media 
institutions stopped broadcasting early on Sunday, February 8. The same day, in 
Chisinau, about 200 people staged a protest on Sunday, shouting: "Down With 
Communists!" and "Down With Dictatorship!" (10) 
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Even though the decision of the council to suspend the licenses of the two media 
organizations appears to have sufficient legal ground, it may be only a pretext for 
pulling these institutions off the air. The Our Moldova Alliance described the 
decision of the Audio Visual Council as "Communist authorities' attempts to 
abolish pluralism of opinion and strangle citizens' freedoms and rights." (11) The 
council is completely subordinated to the Moldovan authorities; therefore, many 
believe that the closure of media organizations is the authorities' way of settling 
accounts with the opposition and pro-opposition media. 
 
Dniestr Settlement 
During a meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria, at the end of January 2004, the mediators of 
a Dniestr settlement, Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, agreed to submit to 
Moldova and the Dniestr region a draft document, which "somewhat differs" from 
the original Russian proposal, said William Hill, chief of the mission of the OSCE. 
(12) Russia is keen on keeping the so-called Kozak memorandum as the basis 
for future talks. The Russian Foreign Ministry has said repeatedly that President 
Voronin refused to sign the memorandum in November 2003, due to pressure by 
the E.U. and the U.S. Voronin claims he made the decision on his own. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
ARMENIA 
On 3 February 04, in an obvious attempt to mimic the Georgian opposition 
movement’s success in overthrowing the former President Shevardnadze, 
Armenia’s leading opposition parties, the Justice (Artarutiun) and the National 
Unity blocs, announced a joint boycott of parliamentary proceedings to protest 
what they termed the majority's "illegal" refusal to debate proposed constitutional 
amendments. (1) These would pave the way for a referendum to show 
confidence in President Robert Kocharian. An 11 February meeting between the 
Armenian parliament leadership and heads of the Justice (Artarutiun) and 
National Unity opposition factions failed to end the opposition's boycott of 
parliamentary sessions. Meanwhile, leaders of the pro-Kocharian majority in the 
National Assembly, which refuses even to discuss the referendum issue, 
appeared untroubled by the latest opposition offensive. In a press conference, 
Armenian Prime Minister Andranik Markaryan negated a potential collapse of the 
ruling coalition, while also stressing his belief that none of the opposition parties 
had the ability to transform the Armenian political landscape by stating, "If there 
are people who want to see their wishes as reality, then that's their problem." (2) 
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The sentiments of the Kocharian government are not unfounded since the 
Armenian opposition movement lacks the unity, organization and direction to 
stimulate a radical change of the political system. The disarray of the opposition, 
evidenced in its inability to select one candidate in the March 2003 presidential 
election, continues in the guise of an inconsistent policy vis à vis the authorities. 
The opposition understands that it cannot achieve the resignation of the current 
authorities by constitutional means, and few of its members are willing to risk the 
revolutionary measures to overthrow the Kocharian regime. At present, the 
Armenian Pan-National Movement APNM and the Anrapetutyun Republic Party 
are the only forces that have stated their readiness to take decisive steps to 
overthrow the authorities. (3) Additionally, violence against the government by 
the Republic Party or the APNM, would most likely be viewed as a personal 
vendetta against Robert Kocharian and not as a fight for democracy. Therefore, 
the recent political developments are partially due to the realization by the 
opposition of its own weakness in confronting the Kocharian government, and 
are unlikely to leave lasting consequences. 
 
GEORGIA 
On 11 February, Georgian deputies approved a bill on the revised structure and 
powers of the government proposed by Minister of State Zurab Zhvania, whom 
President Mikheil Saakashvili intends to name as prime minister. (4) The bill cuts 
the number of ministries from 18 to 15 and reinstates the post of prime minister, 
who can be appointed and dismissed by the president. Ministerial candidates are 
appointed after a proposal by the prime minister and final approval by the 
president; the president also has the power to dismiss the defense, interior, and 
state-security ministers. (5) In addition to these amendments, there are several 
stark contrasts between Saakashvili’s new government and Shevardnadze's old 
one. These differences, among others, are that Georgia’s prime minister would 
not have to resign when the President dissolves the Parliament, and that the 
president is allowed to keep the same prime minister for six months. (6) 
Meanwhile, the only means Parliament has to remove a prime minister, without 
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the consent of the president, is by obtaining a three-fifths majority in the 
legislature. Amendments in budgetary and other legislation ensure that, if the 
Parliament rejects a submitted budget, which must first pass the president's 
purview, the president can dissolve the Parliament, while the prime minister has 
the final approval on any law concerning expenditures either in the current or 
future budget years. (7) Many of these changes are a backlash to the extreme 
fiscal corruption and mishandling that existed under Shevardnadze’s government 
and a reflection of the pervading zeal in Georgia to uproot any government fixture 
associated with government dishonesty and fraud. However, these amendments 
reallocate a good deal of legislative power to the president and his cabinet 
members, and thus allow the Georgian president to dominate debate and dictate 
policy. 
 
In addition to the constitutional amendments, the Georgian government has 
undergone a facelift while Saakashvili seeks to cement support in his cabinet. 
Some of the new appointments are: Vano Merabishvili, the general secretary of 
Saakashvili’s United National Movement, to the post of National Security Council 
secretary- a post that has responsibility for the "power" ministries; (8) Zurab 
Zhvania, who since late November has been Minister of State, to the recreated 
post of Prime Minister; (9) Irakli Chubinishvili, who formerly conducted election 
campaigns for Zhvania’s currently defunct political opposition party, to head of 
the president's administration which deals with the economy, the regions, 
Chancellery staff and the implementation of presidential decrees; (10) and Irakli 
Okruashvili, a close ally of Saakashvili and his representative in the Shida Kartli 
region, to the post of Prosecutor-General. (11) The position of Prosecutor-
General is key, given the tremendous social and political pressure to clean up 
and place blame for the massive corruption in the Georgian government. At 
present, Gia Baramidze remains Georgia's Interior Minister, (12) Petre 
Tsiskarishvili was appointed Deputy Interior Minister (13) on 2 Feb, while Nino 
Burjanadze remains speaker of the Parliament. 
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The reconstruction of the Georgian government is unfinished and any final 
statement on its nature would be hasty, but President Saakashvili’s initial 
maneuvers seek to create a cabinet and ministerial staff personally dependent on 
him, while also allotting a good deal of oversight and legislative power to the 
executive branch. 
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3. Yerevan Mediamax, 10 Feb 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
4. Caucasus Report, 12 Feb 04, via RFERL (www.rferl.org/newsline/2-
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5. Ibid. 
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Of late, most international attention given to Central Asia has focused on the 
region’s energy reserves and the threat of terrorism. However, other social and 
political concerns making the headlines in the last fortnight include water 
regulation, the prison situation, and government restructuring. 
 
Water agreements 
Soviet directives for cotton production in Uzbekistan and irrigation projects that 
increased arable land accelerated the devastation of the Aral Sea. While 
international efforts have confined optimism to saving the northern part of the 
Aral Sea, the sea’s destruction has made very clear the importance of water 
management. As populations increase, so does the demand for water. And for 
countries with a limited supply of water, it becomes as precious as oil and gas. 
 
The mountainous countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have an abundance of 
water and their rivers feed the lands of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. But water becomes a point of contention as representatives try to 
negotiate its regulated release from reservoirs. Usually the concern is an 
insufficient supply to meet the demand, but recent tensions on the Chardara 
reservoir in southern Kazakhstan have just the opposite root. 
 
The reservoir is dangerously near capacity, with the Syr-Darya River threatening 
the Kazakh city of Kyzyl-Orda, where 1300 people have already been evacuated. 
(1) A meeting to discuss regulation of water flow had been arranged for late 
January, but Uzbekistan failed to show up. (2) The capacity of the Chardara is 
5.2 billion cubic meters of water. Every second, it receives 1200 cubic meters 
and it currently holds 4.9 billion cubic meters. (3) If the situation is not addressed 
by 1 March, extensive flooding is likely. (4) 
 
When the meetings finally took place in mid-February, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik and 
Uzbek deputy prime ministers and water-management officials blamed each 
other for disregarding earlier agreements and acting without consideration for 
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their neighbors. Kyrgyzstan was accused of not reducing outflow from the 
Toktogul reservoir and Kyrgyz representative responded with claims that energy 
production had to be reduced by 20 percent and that lost electricity sales should 
be compensated for such regulation. (5) In the summer, Kyrgyzstan hopes to 
exchange electricity for oil and coal with Kazakhstan. And though recent news 
coverage has praised the level of cooperation between the countries of Central 
Asia on issues of security and trade relations, the accusations and recriminations 
prevalent at the eventual mid-February meeting show the struggles and tensions 
these countries have in working together. 
 
The agreement that was eventually reached on 12 February held that Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan would respectively reduce outflow from the Toktogul and 
Qayroqqum reservoirs while Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan would increase uptake 
and leaching along the Syr-Darya. (6) At the same time, Tajikistan has 
dispatched 500 soldiers to shore up the banks of the Panj River which is 
threatening to flood over 2000 farms. (7) 
 
Prison reforms 
Prisons, of course, are not viewed as a desirable place to be, but the reputation 
of prisons in Central Asia is frequently atop the agenda of human rights activists 
wanting reform. In early February, Kyrgyz ombudsman Tursunbay Bakir uulu 
visited prisons in Kyrgyzstan to assess the human rights situation. (8) Remarking 
on crowded prisons, Vladimir Nosov, head of the state penitentiary system, 
argued that additional prisons and staff are necessary to improve the conditions 
of inmates: "A new penal colony would permit better conditions for the inmates, 
would allow us to treat them differently, hold them and influence them and 
employ them." He went on to add that there were eight prisoners to one prison 
warden whereas the ratio in developed countries is generally two to one. (9) 
 
Abuse in the prison systems is assumed, but recently Kyrgyz police officers in 
the Chui Oblast pretrial detention center were charged with abusing and torturing 
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detainees. (10) In Kazakhstan, national television aired footage of convicts at 
Arkalyk Prison being beaten by prison officials, which led the lower house of 
parliament to demand the end of such abuse and request the resignation of 
Justice Minister Onalsyn Zhumabekov. (11) 
 
In Uzbekistan, on 1 December 03, over 700 religious extremists were released 
and granted amnesty by President Islam Karimov. Official reports claim that only 
three out of 400 have returned to their affiliation with militant religious groups for 
which they were initially arrested. (12) Though those numbers seem suspect, the 
Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Uzbekistan, with the Committee of Religious 
Affairs, has worked to assist the amnestied in finding employment. 
 
Political restructuring 
As discussed in the 6 February issue of The NIS Observed, the end of January 
and early February was a time of significant political change in both Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. In Tajikistan, President Imomali Rakhmonov, continued to shuffle 
personnel in what appeared to be an attempt to secure his control prior to the 
2005 parliamentary elections. (13) More significant structural changes, however, 
are seen in Kyrgyzstan with what President Askar Akaev is referring to as the 
"new edition of the constitution." (14) 
 
At an extra session of the People’s Assembly (upper house of parliament), 
structural reforms were approved that redistribute the duties of the fourteen 
ministries, and merge some state commissions into the ministries. Perhaps the 
most significant change is the transformation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Industry into the Ministry for Economic Development, Industry and Trade thereby 
broadening its influence. 
 
(15) Akaev articulated the reason for these changes as a step towards the 
reforms supported by international donor organizations such as the World Bank 
and the United Nations Development Program and said, "These proposals were 
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submitted in accordance with the new edition of the constitution, which was 
adopted in a referendum in February 2003, to upgrade the state administrative 
system, strengthen democratic principles, combat corruption and bureaucracy, 
remove duplication and increase the local branches of power." (16) 
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